[Hardware] RSA Challenges
John L. Bass
jbass at dmsd.com
Mon Jun 4 16:12:51 EDT 2007
Hi Burt,
It would have been much better to have given me notice in Feb
that this would be cancelled, when I provided you some clues about
my line of attack. Did you also conclude this is potentially a much
more viable attack than brute force?
It's certainly not computationally easy either, but appears so far
much better than a 2^N counter. The electric bill for nibbling away
at it term by term hasn't been cheap either.
John
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2007 23:06:37 -0700
From: "John L. Bass" <jbass at dmsd.com>
Message-Id: <200702080606.l1866bm8011226 at dmsd.com>
To: BKaliski at rsasecurity.com, jbass at dmsd.com
Subject: RE: Contact Form [Challenges] RC5-72 secret key challenge
Cc: rsa-labs-info at rsasecurity.com
Thanks Burt,
This is an interesting challenge, but if I get that far, then
likely I'd not share that until it hit pay dirt one way or the
other. It would certainly have to be worth something to someone,
if RSA isn't interested in paying for the months of work.
Have fun!
John
Subject: RE: Contact Form [Challenges] RC5-72 secret key challenge
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2007 22:03:35 -0500
From: "Kaliski, Burt" <BKaliski at rsasecurity.com>
To: <jbass at dmsd.com>
Cc: <rsa-labs-info at rsasecurity.com>
We're expecting to see the key -- but if you did happen to recover the
full plain text (and possibly the SBox values) without recovering the
key, we'd be interested in hearing about that as well, especially how
you did it.
-- Burt
-----Original Message-----
From: jbass at dmsd.com [mailto:jbass at dmsd.com]
Sent: Wednesday, January 31, 2007 9:57 PM
To: rsa-labs-info at rsasecurity.com
Subject: Contact Form [Challenges] RC5-72 secret key challenge
FirstName John~
LastName Bass~
email jbass at dmsd.com~
subject Contact Form [Challenges] RC5-72 secret key challenge~
contact_topic Challenges~
contact_subject RC5-72 secret key challenge~
Comments Would it be enough to simply provide the full plain
text for
the cipher text of the challenge, or must the key actually be provided
to
win? I'm considering other brute force FPGA based ways to approach a
solution, which may not easily allow reconstructing the original
encryption key, just the SBox. Seems the intent of the challenge was
to prove how hard it is to recover encrypted text, not necessarily the
original key, as the actual challenge is worded. The SBox is in many
senses, the real key, and not the seed for the scheduling hashing
algorithm that expands the seed and produces the SBox. Thanks, John
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