danz at lanminds.com
Wed Oct 8 20:11:31 EDT 1997
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On 10/9/1997 1:32 AM, Darrell Fuhriman (darrell at grumblesmurf.net)
>Which means that all the 'bogus block' protections are basically
>moot since one can just sit down and request blocks and never
>process them. It may not prevent the key from being found, but
>it could make it take much longer.
>That's why the whole "we're not releasing source code" to protect
>ourselves is just stupid and irrelevant.
If someone is requesting blocks and not processing them, they
should be rechecked eventually... it may take a while, but the key will
likely still be found. However, if blocks are requested and returned as
checked, and one happens to be the block containing the correct key (as
would be quite possible if the source were released), wouldn't it be
necessary to recheck the entire keyspace? I would think that to recheck
the entire keyspace, as would be necessary unless there were some way
to ensure that the reported blocks were actually checked, would take
longer than delays caused by requested but unchecked blocks.
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-- Dan Ports | One of the main causes of the fall of the
-- danz at lanminds.com | Roman Empire was that, lacking zero, they
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